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Abstract 
Over the past decade, the UK’s New Labour government has been at the forefront of efforts 
internationally to modernise electoral procedures, promising to deliver ‘an e-enabled, multi-
channel general election by 2006’.  This paper considers the origins and the impacts of 
reforms to UK electoral procedures with a particular focus on the adoption of postal voting 
on demand and pilots of electronic voting and counting since 2000. The paper concludes that 
the principal legacy of the modernisation agenda to date is likely to have been a negative 
impact on public confidence in the electoral process. 
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Treating voters as an afterthought? 
The legacies of a decade of electoral modernisation in the United Kingdom. 
 
Recent years have witnessed growing international interest in the scope to modernise 
electoral processes, particularly in light of possibilities opened up by rapid technological 
change. As part of its wider ‘modernisation’ agenda, the UK’s Labour government has often 
been seen as an international leader in this area, committing itself to a target of running ‘an e-
enabled, multi-channel general election by 2006’. The target underlines the ambitious nature 
of the electoral reforms pursued in the United Kingdom over the past decade, particularly 
since the passage of the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 2000, which made provision 
for the immediate introduction of postal voting on demand, as well as for the piloting of 
various forms of e-democracy, most notably electronic voting and electronic counting. The 
key driver of these reforms has been the government’s view that remote voting in UK 
elections, initially through postal ballots and ultimately via ‘multi-channel’ elections, is 
crucial to reversing the sharp decline in electoral participation. 
 
Despite initially widespread support for change, the period since 2002 has witnessed growing 
criticism of the new electoral arrangements. The extension of postal voting has come under 
scrutiny for its potential vulnerability to electoral fraud, particularly after an election court in 
Birmingham found that possibly thousands of postal ballots had been tampered with at the 
2004 local elections. Meanwhile, pilots of alternative methods of casting and counting ballots 
have encountered numerous technical problems and raised concerns about the security of the 
vote. As a result, the Electoral Commission, created as an independent body in 2000 with a 
remit to monitor the electoral process and advise government on electoral law, has become 
increasingly vociferous in its concerns about electoral policy. Most recently, the danger of 
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electoral integrity being threatened as a result of serious flaws in electoral processes was 
dramatically illustrated by the confusion surrounding the count at the Scottish elections of 
May 2007, which saw a dramatic rise in the proportion of rejected ballots and a decision to 
abandon use of electronic counting. An independent review of the events in Scotland, led by 
Ron Gould, identified multiple failing in the electoral process within which ‘the voter was 
treated as an afterthought’.1  
 
This article considers the legacies of New Labour’s electoral modernisation agenda, which 
originated in the review carried out by the Working Group on Electoral Procedures 
established by the incoming government in 1997. It begins by charting the rationale for 
electoral modernisation, and particularly the introduction of postal voting on demand, within 
the context of the UK’s historically conservative body of electoral law. The article then 
assesses the impact of electoral modernisation, with a specific focus on the evidence 
concerning the relative benefits and risks associated with postal voting, electronic voting and 
electronic counting. The article also considers two broader issues which have been neglected 
in academic and policy debates - the state of electoral administration and levels of public 
confidence in the electoral process - both of which raise serious concerns about the legacies 
of electoral modernisation. The article concludes that UK electoral law is no longer ‘fit for 
purpose’ and urges immediate action to restore public confidence in the electoral process. 
 
Electoral modernisation in context 
 
Electoral modernisation in the UK has taken place against the backdrop of a body of electoral 
law built on distinctively Victorian foundations, introduced as part of broader attempts to 
eradicate widespread practices of corruption and malpractice in nineteenth century 
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parliamentary elections. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1854 (as consolidated by the Corrupt 
and Illegal Practices Act of 1883) outlawed a number of specific electoral practices - 
including bribery, treating and intimidation - and, from 1883, placed limits on the election 
expenditure of candidates. The Ballot Act of 1872 introduced the secret ballot, with specific 
requirements that each registered elector would receive, mark and deposit (in a secure box) a 
single, numbered, paper ballot within a designated polling station and in the presence of a 
‘presiding officer’. These Acts, as consolidated by the RPA 1949 and 1983, remained the 
central planks of British electoral law for more than 100 years and significant sections of 
them remain accurate descriptions of current electoral law.  
 
Throughout the twentieth century there had been a cautious and incremental approach to the 
reform of UK electoral law; aside from the extension of the franchise to women in 1918 and 
1928, British electoral law remained markedly conservative for over a century. The RPA 
1948 provided for the entitlement to absentee ballots, previously restricted to service 
personnel, to members of the civilian population unable to attend a polling station on grounds 
of ill-health, disability or age. Under the RPA 1985, these provisions were extended to allow 
registered voters to request postal or proxy ballots if they would be away from their 
constituency on election day, while provisions for proxy votes were also introduced for 
registered British electors living overseas. In this context, the provisions for postal voting on 
demand introduced by the RPA 2000 constitute by far the most significant changes to 
electoral processes in the UK since the mid-late nineteenth century.  
 
Accordingly, when the Working Party on Electoral Procedures was established shortly after 
New Labour’s 1997 General Election victory, with a view to instigating major reforms in 
voting practices, it was determined that the group should include representatives from all 
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three main parties, and seek to form a consensus view on proposed reforms. The Working 
Group, chaired by the Labour MP, George Howarth, issued its final report in 1998, 
recommending the introduction of postal voting on demand and provision for various forms 
of electoral pilots. The changes proposed by the working party were advocated on two main 
grounds, which have been consistently reiterated in government policy ever since. First, it 
was widely argued that there was a need to ‘modernise’ electoral practices to bring them into 
line with wider social change. Second, it was suggested that such modernisation would have a 
positive impact on electoral participation, since the act of rendering voting more convenient 
would serve to increase turnout. 
 
As a product of cross-party consensus, the proposals were translated almost wholesale into 
legislation through the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 2000. The introduction of 
postal voting on demand in 2000 was remarkably uncontroversial, particularly after the 
rationale for postal ballots appeared to be reinforced by turnouts of less than 30 per cent in 
the 1998 local elections and 1999 European elections. Nonetheless, the decision to extend 
postal voting was a major departure in electoral policy. The Howarth Working Group offered 
an interpretation of the risk of electoral malpractice starkly at odds with the conclusions of 
previous reviews of provisions for remote and absentee voting, which had been dominated by 
a concern to ensure the integrity of electoral procedures, than by concerns to maximise 
electoral participation. For instance, the limited extension of postal and proxy voting during 
the 1980s had already prompted concerns by the early 1990s about the possibility of greater 
levels of fraud. Although the absolute number of cases of fraud was relatively small, a Home 
Office Working Party in 1994 considered that instances of electoral fraud underlined the need 
for caution in extending the availability of proxy or postal voting:  
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A move to absent voting on demand might increase the opportunity for fraudulent 
applications to be made without the knowledge of the elector. On balance, we 
consider that the risk of increased fraud outweighs the potential advantage for the 
electorate of making absent voting available to all.2 
 
In stark contrast, the sixty eight page final report of the Working Party on Electoral 
Procedures contained a single reference to electoral fraud, simply stating that the group had 
been careful ‘to look critically at the possible implications for electoral fraud. Overall we are 
satisfied that none of the recommendations we set out below will lead to any significantly 
higher risk of abuse’.3 Based on this confidence, which reflected cross-party consensus 
among members of the Working Party, the report recommended that postal votes should be 
permitted ‘on demand’ and a simplified procedure for applying for postal ballots be 
introduced. These recommendations, as implemented by RPA 2000, have allowed any 
registered voter to request a postal ballot at every UK election since 16 February 2001.  
 
Assessing the impacts of electoral modernisation 
 
The most apparent impact of the new provisions has been dramatic growth of postal voting. 
As figure 1 shows, postal ballots typically comprised 2 to 3 per cent of the votes cast at 
general elections between 1974 and 1997. Prompted by the introduction of postal voting on 
demand, the proportion of ballots cast by post rise to five per cent in 2001 and 15 per cent in 
2005. Whether this sharp rise in postal voting has impacted on turnout out is far less clear, 
however. The 59 per cent turnout in the 2001 General Election represented the lowest level of 
electoral participation since 1918. Moreover, turnout did not rise significantly in 2005, 
despite the sharp increase in the take-up of postal voting. Perhaps the most positive claim that 
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can be made is that postal voting on demand has stabilised general election turnout at around 
60 per cent.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
There have been enormous geographical variations in the take-up of postal voting, which also 
serve to cast doubt on its impact on turnout. At the 2005 General Election, there were 38 
constituencies where at least 25 per cent of votes were cast by post, including 15 where postal 
ballots comprised 33 per cent or more. Among the 15 constituencies in which postal voting 
accounted for at least one-third of votes cast, the change in turnout compared to 2001 varied 
from an increase of 23.8 per cent in Rotherham to a decrease of 14.0 per cent in Tyne Bridge. 
In seven cases, the percentage increase in turnout was either at or below the national average, 
with turnout either falling or remaining essentially static in five seats with widespread take-
up of postal ballots – Jarrow, Hackney South and Shoreditch, Tyne Bridge and Don Valley. 
In light of such patterns in the relationship between the uptake of postal ballots and turnout at 
the 2005 General Election, John Curtice concluded that ‘the wider availability of postal 
voting had, at most, a small impact on turnout’ adding that: 
 
lacking any stimulus to vote, many again stayed at home. Not even the prospect of 
being able to avoid the journey to the polling station enticed many voters to exercise 
their franchise. Turnout depends not on giving people a choice about how to vote but 
rather on what they are voting about.4  
 
Similar issues arise from the evidence relating to the all-postal ballots piloted in local council 
elections after 2000. All-postal ballots pointed to strong initial evidence of postal voting 
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raising turnout at the local elections held from 2000-2004. However, while the introduction 
of postal voting did have an immediate, beneficial impact on turnout, it also appears that the 
‘turnout premium’ is likely to level off, and then decline, at subsequent elections. In areas 
where all-postal voting has been used on multiple occasions, turnout tends to plateau and then 
drop. There is also evidence to suggest that UK experience reflects a widely observed 
international tendency for postal voting principally to provide choice to middle-class voters 
who would probably have voted anyway.5  
 
Concerns about potential electoral malpractice associated with postal voting have been 
widely expressed, particularly since 2004. Unfortunately, empirical data relating to electoral 
malpractice is sketchy, and it is difficult to assess trends. Available records show that 
accusations of electoral malpractice have been investigated by every police force in England, 
with the exception of the City of London police since 2000. Convictions for electoral fraud, 
which represent a small proportion of the cases reported to police forces, have been brought 
against representatives of all three major parties, as well as minor parties such as the British 
National Party. In total, an estimated 42 convictions for electoral offences were made from 
2000-2007. It is unlikely that there has been a significant increase in electoral malpractice 
since the introduction of postal voting on demand in 2000; available figures suggest that 32 
convictions were made from 1994-99. In both periods, the offences arose almost exclusively 
from local elections, and related to a tiny proportion of all elections contested. However, 
cases tried since 2000 underline that the extension of postal voting has clearly enhanced the 
vulnerability of UK elections to large-scale fraud, a risk which should have been predicted 
on the basis of evidence of growing proxy vote fraud during the 1990s. Moreover, the 
potential for the political control of a major city council or the outcome of a contest for 
parliamentary constituency to be determined by ‘stolen votes’ has been clearly demonstrated 
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by recent fraud cases, most notably the offences considered by the Birmingham election court 
in 2005.6 
 
While postal voting has been at the centre of recent controversy about the security of the 
ballot, it is important to reinforce that the government’s medium-term strategy is to move to 
‘e-enabled’ elections. Since May 2002, a variety of electronic voting procedures have been 
piloted across a number of local authorities in English local council elections. In their more 
limited form, these pilots have involved making computer terminals available within polling 
stations. However, there have also been numerous pilots of ‘multi-channel’ electronic voting, 
enabling voters to cast ballots remotely via the internet, telephone or SMS, often with a 
facility for ‘advance voting’ before polling day.  
 
If the impact of postal voting on turnout has been exaggerated by politicians, the limitations 
of e-voting as a means of promoting electoral participation are even more striking. The most 
systematic piloting of electronic voting in the UK has taken place in Swindon, where pilots of 
remote voting via the Internet, telephones, and digital television, as well as the use of mobile 
electronic voting kiosks and laptops within polling stations, were run at local elections in 
2002, 2003 and 2007. In March 2007, the council was awarded beacon authority status for its 
work in electoral services, with particular reference to its piloting of e-voting and wider 
promotion of e-democracy, and the council’s Director of Law and Democratic Services 
described the May 2007 pilot as ‘the most ambitious and complex e-voting pilot scheme ever 
undertaken in the UK’. However, evaluation reports of each pilot scheme produced by the 
Electoral Commission highlight significant limitations with e-voting, which are repeated in 
the experience of less ambitious pilots elsewhere in England. The evaluation studies 
suggested that e-voting pilots had little or no impact on turnout in Swindon, which continued 
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to hover at around 30-35 per cent. Moreover, while e-voting was found to be popular among 
those making use of the facility, more than three quarters of e-voters reported that they would 
have voted had e-voting channels not been provided. In addition, the cost of providing e-
voting facilities was substantial, amounting to £102 for each voter making use of the facility 
in 2007, compared to a cost of £2 per elector for conventional ballots.7   
 
Not only are the benefits of e-voting apparently modest; the potential risks are substantial. 
Although no clear evidence of fraud associated with electronic voting has yet emerged in the 
UK, the possible risks associated with hacking and virus attacks have been widely 
documented. Equally significant is the concern that electronic voting lacks the transparency 
of traditional voting procedures, particularly as there is no ‘paper trail’ that can be audited 
where disputes arise. Likewise, it is clear that the secrecy of the ballot cannot be guaranteed 
where remote electronic voting is permitted. Some of the most concerning anecdotal evidence 
to emerge is that in one local authority, party workers carrying out door-to-door canvassing 
assisted voters in casting their votes via SMS. Many ‘e-voting’ pilots have also experienced 
technical problems, resulting in sometimes lengthy periods during which specific e-voting 
channels became inoperable. Such problems have occurred even in local authorities with the 
most experience of running e-voting pilots, including Swindon, leading the Electoral 
Commission to recommend in Autumn 2007 that a much stronger regulatory and policy 
framework should be put in place before further e-voting pilots are contemplated.   
 
A number of pilots have also been undertaken with electronic counting systems, designed to 
render the counting of votes more efficient and more accurate through the use of bespoke 
hardware to scan (unfolded) paper ballots. ‘E-counting’ has had particular appeal where new 
electoral systems have been introduced, requiring the recording and counting of multiple 
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preferences. From the very first large-scale pilot of e-counting, at the Greater London 
Authority and Mayoral elections of May 2000, potential problems with e-counting have been 
evident. Following a series of problems experienced at the count, it became evident that a 
very large proportion of ballot papers had been rejected. A subsequent GLA inquiry pointed 
to a number of wider shortcomings in the planning and management of the election process.8 
In particular, it was found that the election had been dogged by problems associated with 
insufficient time for planning, additional pressures on electoral administrators arising from 
the management of postal voting, a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities and 
resultant poor coordination among key individuals and agencies, as well as concerns about 
ballot paper design, including confusion among the electorate about the simultaneous use of 
different electoral systems. Virtually all of the problems identified in the GLA report of 2002 
re-surfaced in the Gould report on the Scottish elections, where the failure of the e-counting 
system resulted in a large number of counts being suspended. As with e-voting, recognition 
of the concerns associated with e-counting led the Electoral Commission to also recommend 
suspension of such pilots in Autumn 2007, just prior to the publication of the Gould report. 
 
An electoral system under strain? 
 
While the impact of electoral modernisation on postal voting on turnout is questionable, its 
implications for electoral administration have been clear. In the period since 2004, growing 
pressures have been placed on the UK’s highly localised arrangements for electoral 
administration by persistent legislative change. Local experience varies, but there is 
widespread evidence that electoral administration has long had to operate as a ‘Cinderella 
service’ within many local authorities, suffering from poor levels of resourcing and lack of 
dedicated personnel. Electoral modernisation has revealed significant shortcomings in the 
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capacity of electoral administration, particularly where new regulations have been introduced 
within ultra-short timescale. These problems have, in turn, been exacerbated by local 
variations in the capacity of the printing industry to deliver large numbers of postal ballots, 
both at short notice and to the specifications required. These pressures have evidently taken 
their toll on electoral administration as a profession. It is almost certainly not an exaggeration 
to suggest that in many parts of the country, systems of electoral administration may be close 
to breaking point. A survey of its members carried out by the Association of Electoral 
Administrators (AEA) following the 2007 local elections suggested a series of potentially 
major problems were only narrowly averted and suggested that ‘the ramifications for a 
General Election are indeed extremely worrying’.9 
  
Among electoral administrators there is widespread concern that historically high levels of 
public trust in the integrity of electoral administration will be undermined by pressures on the 
system. This is a serious and fundamental concern, not least because the broader issue of 
public confidence in UK electoral processes merits urgent attention. Figure 2 presents data on 
levels of public confidence in elections for nine West European countries, including Great 
Britain, derived from surveys using identical questions following national elections held from 
the late 1990s onwards. While levels of public confidence in elections are high, by 
international standards, across Western Europe, the figure also points to clear variations 
within Western Europe. The highest rates of public confidence are found in the Scandinavian 
countries, closely followed by Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. By contrast, lower 
rates of public confidence are recorded in the relatively ‘new’ democracies of Portugal and 
Spain. However, among the countries for which data are available, Great Britain has the 
lowest proportion of respondents declaring full confidence in electoral processes. Only 57 per 
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cent of those surveyed in Britain had full confidence in the fairness of the election result, 
compared to 73 per cent on Germany and 88 per cent in Denmark.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Sarah Birch has demonstrated that measures of public confidence in elections across 28 
democracies have a strong positive correlation with both the use of proportional 
representation and with direct public financing of political parties. The absence of such 
measures in the UK therefore goes some way to explaining lower levels of public confidence, 
which it shares with other ‘majoritarian’ democracies such as Canada, New Zealand and the 
USA, where surveys suggest only 34-50 per cent of citizens have full confidence in electoral 
processes. Perhaps more surprisingly, Birch finds that the existence of independent 
institutions for electoral administration, such as electoral commissions, appears to have a 
negative impact on public confidence. While paradoxical, there may be a rational explanation 
for these observed correlations. Birch suggests that, in many countries, electoral commissions 
have struggled to assert independent authority from governing parties. Where disputes break 
out between governing parties and electoral commissions about the conduct of elections, 
public confidence may inevitably be undermined. This observation is highly significant in the 
British case: since 2003 the Electoral Commission has been left increasingly frustrated by the 
government’s refusal to accept many of its key recommendations on voter registration, 
definitions of new electoral offences and suspension of electoral pilot schemes.10 
 
There are no comparative data from equivalent surveys since 2002 to assess whether there 
has been such a decline in overall public confidence in UK elections relative to other 
European countries. However, there is clear evidence to suggest that public confidence in UK 
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elections has declined further over the past decade where postal voting has been widely used. 
In June 2004, 33 per cent of those surveyed thought that postal voting was fairly or very 
unsafe from fraud. Eleven months later, in the wake of the Birmingham judgment, 46 per cent 
expressed such concerns, with virtually the same proportion (44 per cent) subsequently 
offering the same assessment in Spring 2006. Moreover, while the 2004 survey data had 
suggested that 67 per cent of the public felt postal voting to be safe from fraud, this figure fell 
to 51 per cent among residents in the regions where all-postal voting was piloted. Among 
those who had voted in 2006, almost a quarter suggested that fraud was a problem, mainly 
citing media coverage to justify this claim.11  
 
Conclusion 
 
A decade on from the Howarth review of electoral procedures, the balance sheet for electoral 
modernisation looks less than healthy. While provisions for postal and, where relevant, 
electronic voting, have generally elicited high levels of satisfaction among survey 
respondents, there is little evidence to suggest that alternative forms of voting offer any 
significant scope to increase turnout. Pilots of e-voting have suggested it to be costly, with 
the principal benefit being the provision of greater choice to voters who would have largely 
voted anyway. At the same time, the vulnerability of postal voting to fraud has been clearly 
demonstrated, while serious concerns persist about the security and transparency of e-voting 
systems and their vulnerability to organised fraud. Finally, experience to date with e-counting 
has highlighted serious problems associated with the deployment of such technologies. Not 
only has e-counting frequently failed to improve on the estimated time required for a manual 
count, it has also highlighted the lack of transparency in such systems, particularly in 
comparison with manual counting.  In circumstances such as the Scottish elections of 2007, 
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there is a very real danger that the use of such technologies may serve to undermine 
confidence in the electoral process.  
 
The substantial body of electoral law passed since 2000 has left the underlying legal and 
institutional framework for UK elections largely intact. Despite the introduction of postal 
voting on demand, and provision for pilots of electronic voting, the principal electoral 
offences remained those originally defined in the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883. 
Likewise, the principal means of challenging an election result remains the Victorian 
mechanism of the ‘election petition’, which has been demonstrated to be an increasingly 
defective means of responding to allegations of malpractice and fraud. There is growing 
evidence of fundamental tensions between this distinctly Victorian legacy and the processes 
of electoral modernisation. Definitions of electoral offences are outdated, and prosecutions 
for electoral offences are increasingly being brought under anti-fraud legislation rather than 
with reference to electoral law. Moreover, the role of the Electoral Commission is evidently 
compromised, since it is expected to provide a framework for modernised electoral 
arrangements on the basis of nineteenth century legal foundations. 
 
While the Electoral Commission has established itself as a major presence in debates on 
electoral processes, its capacity to lead on electoral matters has been questioned, and it has 
appeared to lack the legal authority enjoyed by equivalent organisations overseas. In 
particular, the Commission has been frequently frustrated by governmental reluctance to 
accept its advice on electoral matters and, as a result, its formal relationship to government 
requires urgent clarification. Indeed, the recent review of the role of The Electoral 
Commission carried out by the Committee for Standards in Public Life confirmed this 
interpretation.  While recognising that the work of The Electoral Commission commands 
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widespread respect, the Committee made 47 separate recommendations concerning its future 
role; these centred upon the Commission’s remit being refocused on the core regulatory 
issues of party funding, campaign expenditure and electoral administration. 
 
However, it is the task of rebuilding public confidence in the electoral process which emerges 
as the most urgent concern highlighted by the evidence presented in this paper. High-profile 
cases of fraud have highlighted vulnerabilities in the electoral system, which have been 
exposed further by investigative journalism. In turn, the apparent reluctance of government to 
recognise the scale and risk of electoral malpractice associated with postal voting is likely to 
have undermined public confidence further. In this regard, it is hugely ironic that electoral 
policy has taken steps to promote the ballot security in Northern Ireland, in response to 
concerns that accusations of electoral malpractice were undermining public confidence in the 
electoral processes, while simultaneously pursuing reforms which have served to undermine 
public confidence in the rest of the UK. When Desmond Browne MP, the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, introduced the second reading of The Electoral 
Fraud (Northern Ireland) Bill in the House of Commons on 10 July 2001, he argued that 
enhanced measures to secure the ballot in the province were required because ‘we do not 
want voters in Northern Ireland to become disillusioned with politics because they fear that 
elections are unfair’.12 Seven years on, the very same words could certainly be used to justify 
significant change to electoral law in the rest of the United Kingdom.  
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Source: Sarah Birch, ‘Explaining Confidence in the Conduct of Elections’, paper presented at the 
Elections, Public Opinion and Political Parties Conference, University of Essex, 9-11 September 
2005. 
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